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I. INTRODUCTION 
In [lo], Schmeidler proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games 
with a nonatomic measure space of players each of whose strategy sets is 
the unit simplex in Euclidean n-space. For the case where the individual 
payoff functions are restricted to depend only on the average response of 
the other players rather than on each of their individual responses, 
Schmeidler also showed the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in 
which almost every player chooses a basic vector in Euclidean n-space as 
his strategy. 
A restrictive aspect of Schmeidler’s results is that the number of pure 
strategies available to each player is uniformly bounded over the set of 
players. It is natural to ask whether such an assumption can be relaxed. In 
this paper we generalize the results in [lo] to nonatomic games in which 
each player’s strategy set is a weakly compact, convex subset of a separable 
Banach space whose dual has the Radon-Nikodym property. In this set- 
ting, a pure strategy equilibrium is one in which almost every player is 
limited to a subset of his strategy set consisting only of its extreme points. 
For equivalent formulations of the hypothesis that a Banach space possess 
the Radon-Nikodym property, the reader is referred to the comprehensive 
work of Diestel and Uhl, [3, especially p. 2171. 
* This paper represents Johns Hopkins Working Paper No. 100, circulated in July 1982. 
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Schmeidler proved his results through the use of the Fan-Glicksberg 
fixed point theorem [S, 61 and the theory of integration of set-valued map- 
pings whose range is Euclidean n-space as set out in Cl]. Our proofs are 
modelled after those of Schmeidler but we have to rely on the 
corresponding theory of Bochner integration of set-valued mappings whose 
range is a separable Banach space. The fact that such a space is not 
required to be reflexive gives mathematical depth to the theory. 
II. THE MODEL AND RESULTS 
Let (T, 9, cl) be a complete, finite, nonatomic measure space, i.e., ,u is a 
real-valued, nonnegative, countably additive, nonatomic measure defined 
on a complete o-field Y of subsets of a point set T such that p(T) is finite. 
T is to be interpreted as the set of players. 
Let X denote a Banach space over the real numbers R and let X* be its 
topological dual. The norm in X and X* will be denoted by II* 11. E(A), 
co(A), cl(A), ext(A) will respectively stand for the closed convex hull, con- 
vex hull, norm closure and the set of extreme points of A. 
Our next set of definitions involve Bochner integrable functions; see [3, 
Chap. II] for details. Let L’(p, X) denote the space of all (equivalence 
classes of) X-valued Bochner integrable functions f defined on T with 
llfll =Jr Ilf(t)ll d,~(t). Similarly, L”(p, X) denotes the space of all 
(equivalence classes of) X-valued, Bochner integrable functions defined on 
T that are essentially bounded, i.e., such that 
We shall abbreviate L’(p, R) and Lm(pL, R) to Lo and La(p), respec- 
tively. A Banach space X has the Radon-Nikodgm property with respect to 
(T, Y, p) if for each p-continuous vector measure G: 5 + X of bounded 
variation, there exists gEL’(p, X) such that G(A)= j, g(t) dp(t) for all 
A E Y. X is said to have the Radon-Nikodgm property (RNP) if X has the 
Radon-Nikodym property with respect to every finite measure space. 
Next, we turn to the measurability of set-valued mappings; see [2, 
Chap. III]. A set-valued mapping P: T + 2x is said to be measurable if the 
graph of P, G, = ((t, X) E T x X: x E P(t)} is an element of Y @ g(X), 
where W(X) is the set of Bore1 subsets of X. P is said to be integrably boun- 
ded if there exists g E L’(p) such that sup{ l/xl/ : x E P(t)} < g(t) for almost 
all t in T. A selection from P is a map 0: T+ X such that o(t) E P(t) for 
almost all t in T. The integral of a set-valued mapping P is defined for any 
AES by 
j-A P(t) &(t) = { 11, o(t) h(t): 0 E Fp) 
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where 9p denotes the family of all measurable selections from P. For any 
set-valued mapping P, the set-valued mappings 5 P and ext P will have 
the obvious meaning. We shall also need the notation 9p for the set 
{~EL~(,u, X):f(t)~ P(t) for almost all 2 in T}. 
A nonatomic game Y is a quadruple [(T, Y, p), X, P, u], where 
1. ( T, 5, p) is a finite, complete, nonatomic measure space. 
2. X is a separable Banach space whose dual possesses RNP. 
3. P: T+ 2* is an integrably bounded map such that ext P is 
measurable and that for all t in T, P(t) is nonempty, convex and weakly 
compact. 
4. u: TX XX L& + R, is a map such that 
(i) for all XEL$, u(*, 3, x) is a Bore&measurable function on G,; 
(ii) for all t E T, x E LZp, u(t, *, x) is quasi-concave and continuous 
on P(t); 
(iii) for all t E T, x E P(t), u(t, x, .) is continuous on Tp. 
These conditions on the nonatomic game seem to us natural for our set- 
ting; indeed conditions (3) and (4) are suggested by Remark 4 in [lo]. We 
can now state 
THEOREM 1. A nonatomic game Y has an equilibrium strategy, i.e., 
x E L& such that for almost all t in T 
u(t, x(t), x) 2 u(t, y, x) for all ye P(t). 
For our next result we shall need an aggregation and a linearity 
assumption, i.e., 
ASSUMPTION 1. For all (t, y) in G, and for all x E J& 
ASSUMPTION 2. For all t E T, x E L$, u(t, *, x) is linear on P(t). 
We can now state 
THEOREM 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a nonatomic game 9 has an 
approximate, pure strategy equilibrium, i.e., YE >O, there exists y E 9&, 
such that 
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where 
We begin with a 
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof is an application of the FanGlicksberg 
fixed point theorem. An equilibrium strategy is a fixed point of the set- 
valued mapping a: ~3’~ -+ 2zp, where 
a(x) = { y E YP: y(t) E B(t, x) for almost all t in T} 
B(t,x)={y(t)EP(t):u(t,y(t),x)~u(t,z,x)VzEP(t)}. 
We have to verify that the mapping a satisfies all the conditions required 
by the Fan-Glicksberg theorem. We do this in a series of claims. 
Claim 1. Y,, is weakly compact. 
See proof of Corollary of Theorem 1 in [7]. 
Claim 2. The graph P belongs to Y 0 B(X), where g(X) is the Bore1 
o-field of the set X. 
We can apply Theorem 111.40 and the remark following Definition III.21 
in [2], to assert that the graph of EJ ext P belongs to Y @ g(X). Since 
P(t) is weakly compact and convex for almost all t in T, an application of 
the Krein-Milman theorem [S, Theorem 11.2.11 completes the proof of the 
claim. 
Claim 3. J&. is nonempty and convex. 
The convexity of ZP follows directly from the convexity of P(f) for all t 
in T. The fact that ZP is nonempty follows, given Claim 2, from the 
von Neumann-Aumann selection theorem, [2, Theorem 111.223. The fact 
that such a selection is integrable follows from the fact that P is integrably 
bounded and that a function f is Bochner integrable if j T Ilf( t) 11 &(t) < co; 
see [3, p. 451. 
Claim 4. For each x in 5&., a(x) is nonempty and convex. 
Given quasi-concavity of u( t, . , x), it is clear that B(t, x) is convex and 
hence a(x) is convex. From the continuity of u(t, ., x) and weak com- 
pactness of P(t), we obtain that B(t, x) # 0 for all t in T. Given Claim 2 
and the Borel-measurability of u( ., ., x), we can apply Lemma III.39 in [2] 
to claim that B, : T + 2x: B,(t) z B(t, x) has a measurable selection. 
Integrability follows from the fact that B(t, x) c P(t). 
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Claim 5. For all t in T, the graph of B(t, . ) is weakly closed in 
P(t) x zp. 
This is a straightforward consequence of the continuity of u(t, ., . ) on 
P(t) x 9p. 
Claim 6. The graph of u is weakly closed in &, x YP. 
Let (x,, yy) converge weakly to (x,,, y,) such that Y”EOI(X,) for all v. 
Suppose y0 6 cx(xO), i.e., there exists S G T, /J(S) > 0 such that 
J%(t) + B(t, x0) for all t E S. 
Let P, be the restriction of the mapping P to S and cr,(x,-,) = {z E YPs: 
z(t) E B( t, x,)}. As in our proof of Claim 3, a,(xO) is nonempty and convex. 
It is also closed. This can be seen by considering a sequence z, E cls(xO) 
which converges to z, i.e., lim, _ m IJz, - zll = 0. This implies that for almost 
all t in T, lim, _ m Ilz,(t) - z(t)11 = 0. Our assertion follows from the closed- 
ness of B(t, x0) which, in turn, is due to the continuity of u(t, *, x) on P(t). 
Now let y,= (xEJ&: x(t) = y,(t) for all t in S}. By hypothesis, 
y,$ I. We can now apply the Hahn-Banach theorem (see [4, 
Theorem 10, p. 4171 for the precise form we need) to claim that there 
exists a nonzero, continuous linear functional, i.e., fe (L’(p, X))*, f#O, 
such that 
KY,) >f(z) for all z E as(xo). (1) 
But by the Radon-Nikodym property [3, Theorem 1, p. 981, the dual of 
L’(p, X) is L”(p, X*). We can thus represent f by gELCO(p, X*) and 
rewrite (1) as 
.r, (J%(t)9 g(t)> 44t) >s, (x(t), g(t)> 44t) vx E %(X0) (2) 
Since y, converges weakly to y,, certainly, 
)i& f, (Y”(t), g(t)> 44t) =js <NJ(t)9 g(t)> 44t) 
Since I(.My gWl < IMt)ll~ ML y&W’(t) and P is in@wW 
bounded, we can apply Fatou’s lemma [4, 111.9.351 to conclude 
Jij\ i, <y,(t), g(t)> 44t)Gjslimsv (VY(th g(t)> &(t). (4) Y-m 
Now r( t ) = lim supv _ o. <yY(t), g(t)> =liw-, <YYk(f19 g(t)>. Since 
y,,(t) E P(t) and P(t) is weakly compact, the Eberlein-Smulian theorem [4, 
V.6.11 guarantees that r(t) is attained at j(t) = limj _ m y{,(t). But by 
Claim 5, v(t) E B(t, x,,) and we have a contradiction to (2). 
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We can now apply the Fan-Glicksberg theorem to complete the proof. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 2. By an appeal to Theorem 1, we know that there 
exists x E YP such that for almost all t, x(t) E B(t, xT), where xT= jT 
x(t) dp( t). Let 
Be(t,xT)= {x~ext P(t):u(t,x(t),x,)>u(t, y,xT) VyEEext P(t)}. 
We can assert 
Claim 1. For almost all t in T, B(t, xT) = E B’(t, xT). 
Since P(t) is a nonempty, weakly compact and convex subset of X, we 
can apply a corollary of the Krein-Milman theorem [8, Corollary 11.2.31 
to assert that there exists p(t) E ext P(t) such that 
4t, p(t), -+I = m: = SUP 46 4, ~~1. 
qEp(I) 
Since p(t) E B’(t, xT), it is clear that B’(t, xT) c B(t, xT). Since B(t, xT) is 
closed and convex, W B’( t, xT) G B( t, xT). Now suppose the containment is 
strict i.e. there exists z E B(t, xT) and z $m B’(t, xT). By the Krein-Milman 
theorem [8, Theorem 11.2.13 there exist zr, z2 in ext P(t) such that 
z=z,+(l+A)z, for some Oc1<1 with at least one zi#Be(t,xT). But 
then u(t, z, xT) c m*, a contradiction. 
CZaim 2. jr B(t, xT) dp(t) = cl jT B’(t, xT) c&(t). 
Since ext P and u( . ) are measurable, we can appeal to the application of 
Lemma III.39 in [2] to assert that B’(e, xT) is a measurable, set-valued 
mapping. It is certainly integrably bounded such that for almost all t in T, 
B’(t, xT) is nonempty and that a B’(t, xT) is weakly compact. The latter 
property follows from Claim 1 and the fact that B(t, xT) is a closed, convex 
and hence weakly closed, subset of a weakly compact set [4, 1.5.7a]. Since 
X* has the Radon-Nikodym property, we can now apply Theorem 2’ 
along with the Remark in [7] to complete the proof of the Claim. 
Now from Claim 2, we can assert that for all E > 0, there exist for almost 
all t, y(t) E B’( t, xT) such that 11 y,- xTll < E. This implies, by continuity of 
u(t, x(t), . ), that for all E > 0, and for all t in T, 
Ilu(t, 4th XT) - 46 4th YT)ll <E 
But from Claim 1, for almost all t in T, 
46 Y, XT) = u(t, 4th XT) 
and the proof is finished. Q.E.D. 
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IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
1. The question as to whether Theorem 2 is valid without the 
aggregation Assumption 1, has already been answered negatively by 
Schmeidler, [lo, Remark 23. However, the question remains as to whether 
we can do without the linearity Assumption 2. The difficulty is in the proof 
of Claim 1; in particular in showing that a quasi-concave function attains 
its maximum at an extreme point. It is not clear to us now this difficulty is 
overcome even in the set-up of [ 101, where it reduces to showing the non- 
emptiness of {e, 1 e, E B( t, 3) >, (equation c, p. 298 in [lo]). 
2. It is clear that relaxation of the separability assumption will require 
fundamentally new mathematical techniques. In particular, the St. Beuve 
extension of the Aumann measurable selection theorem requires the 
underlying space to be Souslin, see [2, Theorem 111.221. 
3. We have used the Radon-Nikodym property of X* in working with 
Loo@, X*) as the dual of L’(p, X). This is required to establish Claims 1 
and 6 in the proof of Theorem 1 and Claim 2 in the proof of Theorem 2. 
The question as to whether one or both of our results are false without it 
remains open. 
4. The key to the approximation in Theorem 2 is the fact that 
Lyapunov’s theorem does not generalize to infinite spaces; see [3, 
Chap. 1X.11. In this connection, we should draw the reader’s attention to a 
similar approximate theorem for a setting with a finite number of agents 
each of whom has strategy sets in Euclidean n-space; see Rashid [9]. 
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